Carvaka School of Thought in Indian Philosophy

Authored by Vikas Singh Panwar

Introduction

The Vedas, the earliest documentation of the intellectual tradition of our great civilisation, are the source of philosophy in India. They were kept under persistent elaboration and illustration and monumental philosophical literature sprang up over several millennia. The Vedas were the source of a large portion of philosophical knowledge, the most important of which are Samkhya-Yoga, Nyaya-Vaisesika, Purva-Mimamsa, and Uttara-Mimamsa. They all believe in the authority and the infallibility of the Vedas. These schools of thought are called Sad Darsana. Three significant schools of Indian philosophy attempted to profess something novel while departing from the Vedic way of thinking. They were branded as nastika. This category was indexed to include Carvaka, Jain, and Buddhist schools of thought. Therefore, classical Indian philosophy was primarily divided into astika and nastika sampradayas (orthodox and heterodox). Among these philosophical systems or schools of thought, the Carvaka school of thought stands out in its epistemological, ontological and metaphysical orientation as no other school of thought does.  The position of Carvakas is conspicuous and distinct among all the schools of traditional Indian philosophy because it is the only school which rejects outright ishwara (God), atman (soul), paraloka (afterlife) and the authority of Vedas. It stands out as a unique thought which accepts only pratyaksha (perception) as the valid means of knowledge (pramana). It is unexampled as it talks of only four basic elements and lays an over-emphasis on sensual pleasure. Even its concept of moksha (liberation) is unorthodox and strange because it treats moksha as the destruction of the body. It does not believe in the soul and clearly rejects the concept of karmaphala and rebirth. All this makes Carvaka a unique ideology and system of thought. This is referred to as the materialistic school of thought, which as a philosophy maintains that the only object that can be demonstrated to exist is matter, and it is considered a type of physicality. This ideology attempts to explain the mind and consciousness as matter-produced phenomena. In general, materialism refers to the inclination to reduce the higher to the lower or to explain the higher phenomena in terms of the lesser ones. In this way, it contradicts spiritual explanations of the universe. Materialism denies both the reality of God and the existence of the soul. In the Sanskrit language, asti means “to exist” and nasti means “does not exist.” In common parlance, astika means one who believes in the reality of God and nastika means one who believes that God does not exist. But in philosophical parlance, astika and nastika have different meanings. A staunch astika is one who believes in the reality of God, soul, rebirth and the Vedas, and one who rejects them outright is called a nastika. Carvaka is the only school of thought that can be labelled as outright nastika by this yardstick. The Buddhists and Jainas do not fit into this category because the Buddhists believe in parloka and the Jainas believe in atman, even if both reject the authority of the Vedas. Thus, Carvaka is the only school of thought within Indian Philosophy that can be labelled a nastika sampradaya. The Carvaka School looks to be very influential and thought-provoking, paving the way for many ideological wrongs to be corrected because it always talked about things that appealed to the ordinary masses. This could be why the Carvakas were dubbed Lokayatas. Because the principles of this school were practical and compelling, they were extremely popular among the general public.

Genesis and Development of Indian Materialism

The school of Materialism in India seems very old. References are found to it in the epics and in the early Buddhistic literature. ‘Several vestiges show that even in the pre-Buddhistic India proclaimers of purely materialistic doctrines appeared’ (Garbe, 1897)⁴. It must have arisen as a protest against the excessive monkdom of the Brahmana priests. The externals of ritualism, which ignored the substance and highlighted the shadow, the idealism of the Upanisads that was inappropriate for the common people, the political and social upheavals that were common at the time, the exploitation of the masses by the petty rulers, monks, and the wealthy class, the lust and greed and small-scale conflicts in an unstable society, and these factors all contributed to the rise of materialism in India in the post-Upanisadic and pre Buddhitsic age. There are four distinct steps in the evolution of Indian materialism (Shastri, 1930, p.1)¹². It started out as merely an oppositional attitude that questioned all forms of knowledge, both direct and indirect, and disregarded the legitimacy of the Vedas. Its name at the time was Barhaspatya. In its second stage, Svabhavavada, which acknowledged perception as a source of knowledge and incorporated the belief that the body and the self are one and the same, was added. It is indisputable that, during that remote period of Indian history, it was the only philosophical system deserving of the term, regardless of how low it may have fallen in the hierarchy of philosophical systems. In that period flourished famous materialists like AjitaKesakamblin, Kambalasvatara and Purana Kasyapa. In that stage it came to be known as hedonism, which was due, perhaps, to the corruption of freedom - social, religious and political- which formed the most essential feature of this school. As a consequence of this impact of corruption and misunderstanding Carvakism originated. In that stage, the school preached “ Eat, drink and be merry” for tomorrow we may die. The response to this extreme licentiousness was detrimental to the school's very existence. From that point on, this extremely materialistic school began to move towards spiritualism and eventually began to recognise and embrace, albeit in a limited way, both probability and inference as sources of genuine knowledge. In the fourth stage, it came to be one with the Buddhists and the Jainas in opposing the Vedantists and got the common designation nastika (Shartri, 1930, 2)¹².

Etymology of Carvaka

The Brihaspati Sutra and other pieces of Carvaka's main literature are lost or missing. Its theories and growth have been drawn from ancient secondary literature, including the shastras (such as the Arthashastra), sutras, and Hindu epics (the Mahabharata and Ramayana), as well as conversations by Gautama Buddha and Jain literature. The traditional founder of this school is thought to have been the heretical teacherBrhaspati. Sadly, his Sutra has been lost, despite the fact that we have no reason to dispute it. This Brhaspati is sometimes compared to the gods' teacher who taught the Asuras materialism in order to ruin them. Carvaka, after whose name this school is so called, is said to be the chief disciple of Brhaspati. According to another view, Carvaka is the name of the founder of this school(Shastri, 1930, p. 28)¹². ‘Carvaka’ is the word that generally stands for ‘materialist’. But the original meaning of this word is shrouded in mystery. According to one view, ‘Carvaka’ was originally the name of a sage who propounded materialism. The common name ‘Carvaka’ is derived from this proper name and means the follower of that sage, i.e., a materialist. According to another view, ‘Carvaka’ was even originally a common descriptive name given to a materialist, either because he preaches the doctrine of ‘eat, drink and be merry’ (carv- eat, chew), or because his words are pleasant and nice (caru-nice, vak-word) (Chatterjee & Datta, 1948, 64)². Another synonym of Carvaka is Lokayata which means a commoner and therefore, by implication, a man of low and unrefined taste. Nastika-Shiromani or an ‘arch-heretic’ is another name for a materialist. In Ramayana, they are called ‘fools who think themselves to be wise and who are experts in leading people to doom and ruin’ (Sharma, 1962, 29)¹¹. References to them are also found in Mahabharata and Manusamhita. Ajitakeshakambalin is mentioned in the MajjhimaNikaya as a materialist who only trusted in perception and the four elements. He was likely given this name since he must have carried a blanket of hair with him. He is also referred to as Kambalashvatara by Shantaraksita (the man with a blanket and a mule). But whoever the founder of Indian materialism, ‘Carvaka’ has become synonymous with ‘materialist’. A much later work by Jayarashi Bhatta called Tattvopaplavasimha, which was published by the Oriental Institute of Baroda in 1940, is the only original work from this school that has survived. Consequently, it is exceedingly challenging to have a true understanding of it. The writings of other schools serve as our main information sources. However, this is just done to challenge materialism. So we discover that the principles of materialism are frequently misinterpreted. The negative aspects of this school are highlighted, while its positive aspects are left out. So, instead of a whole picture, we just receive a thin caricature. A synopsis of this school is provided by the Sarva-Darshana-Sangraha, however, it also appears to be based on similar narratives.

Epistemology

It is legitimate to say that the entire philosophy of Carvakas is based on their notion of knowledge or epistemology. Knowledge of reality or valid cognition is called ‘prama’ and the source of such knowledge is called ‘pramana’. The Carvakas maintain that perception is the only pramana or reliable source of knowledge. What is arrived at by direct perception is the truth. That alone exists. What is not perceivable is non-existent, for the simple reason that it is not perceived (Radhakrishnan, 1927, 279)⁹. They assert that the only correct knowledge is that we can perceive through our senses. To authenticate their stance, they criticise the potentiality of other sources of knowledge like inference and testimony which are accounted as valid pramanas by many other philosophical schools of thought. The Carvaka is the only school of traditional thought that solely recognised and acknowledged pratyaksha (perception) as a legitimate form of knowledge. The idea is derived mainly from Madhava's treatment of the Lokayata-epistemology in the Sarvadarshansangraha. That which is not perceived is non-existent according to this school of thought.

Denial of Inference

This leads the Carvakas to deny and refute the validity of other sources of knowledge like inference. The Carvakas proceed to deny the legitimacy of inference in a systematic and destructive manner. Inference is the process by which we claim one proposition to be true or false on the basis of other propositions. The Carvakas argue that if inference is to be considered a pramana, it must produce knowledge that is accurate to reality and about the veracity of which we have no doubt. However, inference is unable to satisfy these requirements because for instance, when we infer the existence of fire in a mountain from the perception of smoke in it, we take a leap in the dark, from the perceived smoke to the unperceived fire (Chatterjee & Datta, 1948, 65-66)². A universal relationship (vyapti) between the major terms and the middle term (Linga) is required for inference (sadhya). But this is an excessive assumption or vyapti. No source of valid knowledge can guarantee it. Thus, for example, the inference of fire (sadhya) from smoke (linga) can be valid only when it is established that all cases of smoke are cases of fire (vyapti). But there is no source of valid knowledge that can justify this universal relation. Perception cannot do it because it is limited to particulars^. (Chattopadhyaya, 1959, 22-23)³.

An invariable concomitance between smoke and fire can only be established if we have the knowledge of all the cases of smoke and fire, which is impossible as we cannot perceive all the cases of smoke and fire existing presently in different parts of the world, to speak nothing of those which existed in the past or will exist in the future. Therefore, perception cannot establish an immutable connection. A general proposition may be true in perceiving cases, but there is no guarantee that it will hold true even in unperceived cases.

There are two patterns of inference which in modern terminology may be referred to as “deductive” and “inductive” inference. From an epistemological point of view, The Carvakas  reject not only the distinction between deductive and inductive inference but also inference itself as an invalid and unreliable source of knowledge (Pulingandla, 1975, 28-29)⁸. The Carvakas say that deductive patterns like-

‘All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is mortal’, cannot be accepted because we cannot say that Socrates is mortal unless we are certain that the statements "All men are mortal" and "Socrates is a man" are true.

The principle of petitio principii vitiates deductive inference.Being that the conclusion is already implied by the major premise, the veracity of which is not already established, it is merely a circular argument.

Let's now look at the inductive pattern of reasoning to determine the validity of the generalisation that "All men are mortal."

A universal proposition is supported by specific propositions in induction. That is, we get to the conclusion that all men are mortal by observing that certain men, like x, y, and z, are mortal. Carvakas, though, believes that this is a plunge into the unknown. All that we are permitted to know is that, up to this point, all men have been mortal, hence this universal premise is unwarranted.

Deductive inference’s main premises are upheld by inductive inference, which sets out to demonstrate their truth. But because it moves unwarrantedly from the known to the unknown, induction too becomes uncertain and unsure.

This reasoning of Carvakas is faced with an inevitable question - What explains the uniformities that experienced objects possess if Carvakas deny the existence of a fixed universal law underlying the phenomenon of the world? ‘Why is fire always experienced to be hot and water to be cool?’

The Carvakas reply is that it is due to the inherent nature (svabhava) of things that they possess particular characteristics. There is no guarantee that the uniformity perceived in the past would continue in the future (Chatterjee & Datta, 1948, 67-68)².

Every system of Indian philosophy that has maintained the validity of at least perception and inference has harshly attacked the crude Carvaka stance. Rejecting the validity of inference from an empirical perspective is equivalent to rejecting thought and discussion. All thoughts, all discussions, all doctrines, all affirmations and denials, all proofs and disproofs are made possible by inference. The Carvaka view that perception is valid and inference is invalid is itself a result of inference. The Carvaka can understand others only through inference and make others understand him only through inference. Thoughts and ideas, not being material objects, cannot be perceived; they can only be inferred. It is frequently discovered that perception itself, which the Carvaka holds to be genuine, is false. Although it is almost round, the world appears to be flat to us. The earth is moving around the sun even though we think of it as being static. The sun's disc may appear little to us, yet it is much larger than the size of the earth. Such perceptions are in conflict with inference (Sharma, 1962, 31-32)¹¹.

Due to the dearth of original literature on Carvaka's philosophy, a question which is justifiably encountered is whether the commentators of the base texts, which were mostly his opponents, were able to sufficiently reflect the intention of the author. Therefore it is imperative to reconstruct and reiterate the Carvaka philosophy at the very fundamental level of its assumptions of epistemology and construction of knowledge. Did Carvakas really hold the view that perception is the only source of valid knowledge and nothing else?

In the Tattvasangrahapanjika, Kamalsila quotes Purandara’s statement- “The Carvakas too admit of such an inference as is well known in the world, but that which is called inference ( by some ), transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited by them.” This is called the lokaprasiddhaanumana, an inference which is acceptable within the framework of our mundane life, however, one proposed to extend its application beyond the range of this-worldly objects shall be discarded outrightly.

Jayantabhatta, in his Nyayamanjari distinguished between two types of inferential cognition: (1) “some in case of which the inferential cognition can be acquired by oneself” (utpanna-pratiti) and (2) “some in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired on somebody else’s advice” (utpadya-pratiti). Utpanna-pratiti refers to something experienced in the past, and utpadya-pratiti means that which is yet to be experienced. He, therefore, suggested that the first kind is valid, but the second is not. The inference of the fire from the smoke belongs to the first category. The inference of transcendent entities like God belongs to the latter. As a result, the first type of anumana is recognised as pramana, whereas the second is not. This viewpoint, according to Jayantabhatta, is held by the Carvakas who are "better educated" (susikshitara). Summarily, it can be concluded that the Carvaka position on anumana can be presented - empirically testable anumanais pramanain the instrumental sense of the term, but anumanawhich is not so testable is not pramanaeven in the instrumental sense ( as seen in the case of utpadya-pratiti) (Gokhale, 1993, 676-678)⁵.

Hence it cannot be conclusively established that the Carvakas rejected anumana (inference) in all entirety as seen in the above examples. Manibhadra, in his commentary on Sat Darshan Samuccaya, gave some extremely striking reasons for the Carvaka or Lokayata emphasis on the primacy of sense-perception. The causes are socio-political and seem eerily contemporary. There are crafty con artists who dress in religious attire. They're trying to instil false beliefs in people's heads about achieving paradise and being able to distinguish between the good and the wicked etc. and are trying to establish their claims on the basis of futile references to such sources of valid knowledge as inferences, scriptures, etc. The Lokayata insistence on the primacy of sense-perception was meant to be a defence against such deception and exploitation. If the unperceived too, as Manibhadra explains, were given the status of existence then the poor could as well delude themselves with the idea of possessing a heap of gold and such they would trample over their sense of poverty with a kind of indifference; the slave, too, would delude himself with the idea that he had become the master (Chattopadhyaya, 1959, p. 29-30)³. As a result, just as orthodox religious defenders felt it necessary to reject reason in favour of faith, the Lokayatikas and Carvakas felt it necessary to refute the false assertions of the deceivers in order to defend the general populace.

Metaphysics

Metaphysics is the theory of reality. Since perception is the only valid form of knowledge, Matter becomes the only reality. It alone is cognisable by senses. What is material is real. God, soul, heaven, life before birth or after death, and any unperceived law cannot be believed in, because they are all beyond perception. The only things whose existence can be acknowledged and whose actuality can be insisted upon are material items. Thus, the Carvakas arrive to support the thesis of materialism, which holds that nothing exists outside of matter.

The World is Made of Four Elements

Common Hindu thought recognizes five elements which compose the material world - earth, water, fire, air and akasa. While the first four of these are matters of ordinary sense experience, the last is the result of inference. The Carvaka, because he admits only the immediate evidence of the senses, denies the last (Hiriyanna, 1993, 191)⁷. The four perceptible elements are thus believed to make up the material world. All things, including the mind, are a result of a particular arrangement of these four elements. Although the components are eternal, their combinations can be created and destroyed. It is believed that consciousness is merely a byproduct of matter.  It is created when the components come together in a specific ratio. It is found always associated with the body and vanishes when the body disintegrates. The universe is accepted as uncreated, composed of matter but of which all that exists is produced.

Self or Soul in the Carvaka View

According to Cārvākas, when the four forms of matter, namely, earth, water, fire and air combine in a peculiar way, there result in what we call a body. Life, breath (prāna) and consciousness are present only in such a body. The particular combination of elements which make life and consciousness possible is called the self, according to Carvakas, beyond which there is no immaterial self or soul. The origin of consciousness or intelligence comes from the combination of elements as liquor’s inebriating power comes from the mixture of ingredients (Heera, 2011, p. 70-71)⁶. “That intelligence which is found to be embodied in modified forms of non-intelligent elements is produced in the same way in which red colour is produced from the combination of betel, areca nut and lime.” (Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy, 1882)

Consciousness is the result of emergent and dialectical evolution. It is an epiphenomenon, a by-product of matter. Given the four elements and their particular combination, consciousness manifests itself in the living body. ‘Matter secretes mind as the liver secretes bile.’ (Sharma, 1962, 32)¹¹ The so-called soul is simply the conscious living body   (Caitanya-visista-dehaevaatma). The soul is, therefore, the body, endued with consciousness. There is no proof of the existence of the soul apart from the body^..

In the Sarva Darshan Sangraha, it has been quoted -

In this school, there are four elements, earth, water, fire and air;

And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,

Just like the intoxicating power from the quinoa, etc, mixed together;

Since in “I am fat,” “I am lean,” these attributes abide in the same subject,

And since fatness, etc, reside only in the body, it alone is the soul and no other,

And such phrases as “my body” are only significant metaphorically.

The arguments advanced by Carvakas against the permanence of the soul and its transmigration from one body to another can be summarized as follows -

1. Why does a person not recall things that happened in his past existence if the soul changes bodies in a cycle of births and deaths?
2. Why does the soul never return in a way that can be seen if it is reborn into another body? If he who departs from the body goes to another world, how is it that he comes not back again, restless for the love of his kindred?
3. According to the Carvakas, it is foolish to believe in reincarnation as evidenced by the so-called believers' own lack of genuine belief. If the beast slain in the Jyotisama rite will itself go to heaven, why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father? (Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy, 1882, 10)
4. No one has ever seen the transfer of consciousness from one body to another.

Naturally, the denial of the atman, which plays a significant role in the other Indian systems, sparked the fiercest debate; theoretically, there is no disputing Carvaka's viewpoint. The existence of the soul or atman in the conventional sense cannot be proven. In fact, some orthodox philosophers are aware of this, which is why they emphasise the validity of the opposing view—that the body and the soul are not separate—in their arguments against the Carvaka theory. If consciousness is an essential property of the human body, it should be inseparable from it as Carvaka claims. But it is not. In swoons, fits, epilepsy, dreamless sleep etc. the living body is seen without consciousness. Conversely, in dreams, consciousness can be seen without a living body.  An awakened dreamer disowns the dream body but retains ownership of the dream consciousness. Even though dream consciousness is not directly challenged in waking life, the dream objects are sublated there. When a person wakes up from a dream in which they saw a tiger, they understand that the tiger was simply a dream, but the fact that they saw a tiger in their dream continues to be true. This demonstrates that awareness transcends the material body, which is merely its instrument and not its cause and endures through the three stages of waking life, dream life, and profound sleep life (Sharma, 1962, 33). Once more, the fact that consciousness cannot be felt outside of a physical body does not indicate that it is merely a byproduct of matter. For instance, the eye cannot see in the dark. Light is necessary for sight, yet it cannot be said to be the cause of sight. A simple coexistence is not a cause. The two bull horns, which are always found together, cannot be taken to mean anything. The body should not be viewed as the cause of awareness because it is merely a tool for its manifestation.

Denial of the Existence of God

The doctrine unavoidably rejects any and all belief in a supernatural or transcendental being, along with any and all belief in the particular subjects of religion and philosophy.As was already mentioned, the system only accepts that which is verified by perception, or pratyaksha, hence there is no room for anything transcendental. God, whose existence cannot be perceived, fares no better than the soul. The world is created by the elements of matter, negating the need for a creator. Carvakas are faced with the counter that just like the production of an earthen pot, in addition to clay which is its material cause, requires a potter who shapes the material into the desired form, similarly, an efficient cause like God is indispensable for shaping and designing the material elements into this beautiful world. In reply, the Carvakas state that the material elements themselves have got each its static nature (svabhava). By nature and the laws inherent in them, they combine to form this world. There is thus no necessity for God. There is no evidence that the world's objects are the outcome of any design. They can be logically explained as the accidental byproducts of the elements. The Carvakas, therefore, prefer atheism.The only supreme is the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world’s eyesight, and the only liberation is the dissolution of the body (Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy, 1882, 4). In the same breath, Carvakas deny the existence of souls, virtue (dharma) and vice (adharma), merit (punya) and demerit (papa), actions (karma) and their fruits (phala). They reject liberation, heaven, hell, future life, transmigration, the Law of Karma, and pre-existence. They do not exist because they are not perceived. There are no obligations related to castes and life stages (varnashrama dharma), which could result in rewards like happiness and unhappiness. The material world is perceived, and therefore existent. The variety in the world is natural (Sinha, 1956)¹³.

Ethics

Ethics is the science of morality which tends to contemplate questions and problems such as: What is the highest goal or Summum bonum man can achieve? What is the standard of moral judgement?

As explained by Madhava in his Sarvadarshansamgraha-

“The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasure. Nor may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are always mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy the pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which inevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish takes the fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he wants, desists; or just as the man who desires, rice takes the rice, straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. If anyone so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure, he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the poet-

The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects,

Is it to be relinquished as accompanied by pain, such is the reasoning of fools;

The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains

What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered with husk and dust?” ^{(Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy, 1882, p. 4)}

And thus is the well-known verse attributed to the Lokayatas -

jāvajjīvetsukhaṃjīvedṛṇaṃkṛtvāghṛtaṃpibet |

bhasmībhūtasyadehasyapunarāgamanaṃkutaḥ. |

While life remains, let a man live happily

Let him feed on ghee, even though he runs on debt.

Some Indian philosophers, such as the Mimamsakas, hold that paradise, a state of unadulterated happiness that can be obtained after fulfilling the Vedic rites, is the highest aim of human life. Because it is predicated on the unproven existence of a life beyond death, Carvakas rejects it. The priests' creations of "heaven" and "hell" were motivated by their desire to coerce, intimidate, and force people into performing rituals. Men of wisdom will never fall for such tricks.

Final Liberation

Liberation is seen by many thinkers as the ultimate aim of human existence. Again, liberation is seen as the complete eradication of all suffering. Some believe it can only be gained after death when the soul is liberated from the body; others think it can be attained while one is still alive. However, the Carvaka system contends that these opinions are illogical and unreasonable. Because there is no such thing as a soul, it is ridiculous to say that liberation is the soul's release from its shackles to physical life. But if achieving a state free from all sorrow in this particular life is what emancipation entails, then that is likewise an unachievable ideal. Both pleasure and pain are a part of existence in this body. Liberation in the sense of complete cessation of suffering can only mean death (Chatterjee & Datta, 1948, 74)³.

Summum Bonum

The Carvaka believes that sensuous pleasure is the ultimate good in ethics. Eat, drink, and enjoy yourself since there is no chance of returning once the body has been converted to ashes. No other world exists. No soul can live on after death. Religion is the means of livelihood of the priests. All values are essentially false illusions created by a sick mind. The Carvaka Ethics is a rudimentary form of individual hedonism; the individual's enjoyment of their pleasures in this life is their only goal (Sharma, 1962, 34)¹¹. Of the four ends of human life (purusarthas) namely artha, kama, dharma and moksha, the materialist recognises and commends the first two and regards the last two as illusory and hence unworthy of man’s attention (Pulingandla, 1975, 34-35)⁸. Pleasure is regarded as mixed up with pain, but that is no reason why it should not be acquired. ‘Nobody casts away the grain because of the husk? Should nobody cook because of beggars? Should nobody sow seeds because of animals? (Hiriyanna, 1993)⁷ Carvaka ethics is considered totally hedonistic because it openly encourages the fulfilment of desires and the pursuit of pleasure as the only values to be pursued in life. If we recall that our existence is limited to our body's existence and so to this life, we must see the joys that arise in the body as the only nice things we may attain. So, the purpose of human life is to experience as much pleasure as possible while minimising suffering. A life of maximum enjoyment is a good existence. Vedic ethics had advocated four purusarthasor the ends of life for the integrated development of the individual as well as the society. At the time Carvaka came into existence, many heretic and revolutionary schools of philosophy led by such figures as Asuri Pippalda, Purana Kasyapaa, KakudaKatyayana and AjitaKesakambalin were flourishing, and all of them opposed the traditional Vedic philosophy in one way or the other. But Carvaka was the first and only system in India to advocate hedonistic ethics (Heera, 2011, 76-84)⁶.

Rejection of the Authority of Vedas

According to the Carvakas the Vedas are tainted by the three faults of untruth, self-contradictions and tautology (needless repetition of an idea, statement, or word), then again the imposters who call themselves Vedic pandits are mutually destructive, as the authority of the jnana-kanda is overthrown by those who maintain that of karma-kanda, while those who maintain the authority of the jnana-kanda reject that of the karma-kanda; and lastly, the three Vedas are themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying-

“The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetics’ three staves, and smearing oneself with ashes” (Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy, 1882, 9).

Having rejected the authority of the Vedas and texts, the concepts of virtue and vice, and belief in life after death, the Carvakas are naturally hostile to religious ceremonies performed with the goal of achieving paradise, avoiding hell, or propitiating departed spirits. If the priests truly believe, as they claim, that animals sacrificed are guaranteed to enter paradise, why don't they sacrifice their elderly parents instead of animals, ensuring their place in heaven?

That the Lokayatikas were opposed to the Brahmanical rituals does not necessarily mean that they were opposed to rituals as such; the conflict could have been because they wanted to stick to their own rituals and these rituals were rooted in a set of beliefs with which orthodox Vedic authority was in direct conflict. At the same time, Loakayata were essentially materialistic in the sense of acknowledging the reality of nothing but the material human body and the material universe around us. If therefore, the Lokayatikas or Carvakas had at all practised any rituals, such rituals could have little to do with otherworldliness (Chattopadhyaya, 1959, 36-37)³.

Social Outlook of Carvaka and Relevance in Contemporary Times

The ideological movement of Carvaka was probably a reaction against the beliefs, superstitions, rites and rituals of the Vedic age. The Carvakas were free thinkers. They set to demolish the foundation of orthodox Indian philosophy. The Carvakas are champions of rational empiricism because for them pratyakshais the only pramana and God is non-existent for them. It is the only system in traditional Indian philosophy which does not believe in anything which is beyond the catchment area of perception.  Attempts have been made to reconstruct the epistemology of the Carvaka/Lokayata system by assiduously collecting the fragments of the sutra works and its several commentaries as found quoted and paraphrased by its opponents. But no serious effort has so far been undertaken to reconstruct its social outlook. It appears from the work of Krishnamisra and Sriharsha, two Vedantin-philosopher poets, that the Carvakas were opposed to caste and gender discrimination. In Krishnamisra (eleventh century) allegorical play, Prabodhcandrodaya (Rise of Moon-like Intellect), Mahmoha (Great Delusion), an avowed materialist, declares -

‘If the bodies are alike in their different parts, the mouth, etc., how can there be a hierarchy of castes?’

A heretic in Sriharsa’s (twelfth century) Naisadhacarta (Life of Naisadha) throws a challenge to the forces of status quo ante:

‘Since the purity of caste is possible only in the case of purity on each side of both families of the grandparents, what caste is pure by the purity of limitless generations?

Fie on those who boast of family dignity! They hold women in check out of jealousy; but do not likewise restrain men, though the blindness of passion is common to both!

Spurn all censorious statements about women as not worth a straw. Why dost thou constantly cheat people when thou, too, art as bad as women?'

Both authors intended to depict the Carvakas as heretics and non-believers. Defiance of the caste system was considered a heretical idea and hence fit for censure (Bhattacharya, 2-4)¹. Apparently, the Carvakas gave no credence to the Vedic idea that the Brahmins, Rajanyas (warriors), Vaisyas (traders and agriculturists), and Sudras (manual workers) were different parts of the supreme being called the purusa, which was a convenient way of explaining why the hierarchy of castes was bound to be accepted and observed in social life.Manu, the foremost lawgiver, received no consideration from the Carvakas. They did not regard Manu's or the Vedas' words as legitimate sources of knowledge. So, it is quite likely that the Carvakas did not adhere to caste norms in daily life and did not believe in the purported divine origin of castes. A verse attributed to the Carvakas runs as follows:

There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in

Another world.

Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders,etc.

Produce any real effect.

The Carvakas did not admit word (sabda), that is, verbal testimony as a valid instrument of cognition (pramana), and so were not bound to accept what the Brahminical law books declared as something sacrosanct. Last but not least, it is clear that Lokayatikas fought for the development of social and political institutions free from religious dogma. The Carvakas had an ideal society in mind—one without organised religion, caste prejudice, or gender inequality which flows from their unprecedented ability of free thinking and opposing the Shastras prescribing rituals, social practices and customs. They took a completely reasonable attitude and criticised such renunciations as obstacles to establishing a society with equality of rights and opportunity. Their social philosophy was basically democratic in this regard.

The Decline of Carvakas  

Most of the stalwart scholars of different schools of classical Indian philosophy have been contemptuous towards the Carvakas. This was a major reason for their downfall. This is evident from the fact that there are no extant original writings of the Carvaka school (with perhaps the exception of a much later work, Jayarasi Bhatta’s Tattvopaplavasimha), our knowledge of the doctrines of Indian materialism is based on the other schools, which seem to be more interested in discrediting and lampooning materialism than in presenting an objective account of its tenet. Therefore it's no surprise, then, that materialism could never occupy a prominent and predominant position in the Indian philosophical paradigm. Many scholars believe that the outright rejection of the authority of the Vedas and the denouncement of the brahmana priests were fundamentally instrumental in the downfall of the Carvakas. But it cannot be considered as the sole cause since the Jainas and the Buddhists also have been equally contemptuous and opprobrious towards them. Rejection of God also is not much responsible for their downfall, because the Jainas, the Buddhists, the Samkhyas and the Mimamsakas too do not believe in the existence of God. The denial of the soul is shared along with materialism by some schools of Buddhism also. The theoretical reduction of the mind to the matter also cannot be regarded as the main cause to merit universal contempt that has fallen to the lot of the Carvakas. Individual hedonism also has an appeal to the animal in man and pleasure, in fact, is desired by all. The main cause, therefore, should be sought in Carvaka’s denial of all human values which make life worth living. Life without values is animal life, not human life. Sensual pleasure is a very faint shadow of supreme pleasure. There is a qualitative difference in pleasure. The pleasure of the pig is certainly not the same as the pleasure of the philosopher.¹ The idea of atheism and rejection of God also could not flourish significantly in an essentially spiritual nation like Bharat where God, religious customs, rituals, traditions, and festivals are so indispensably etched into the lives of people. Carvakas, despite their rational empiricism and worldly outlook, failed to satisfy the spiritual thirst of the populace. In this respect, Buddhism and Jainism prospered more because of the spirituality and piousness inherent to them. The universalising tendency of the Carvaka exposition of atheism and materialism also suffered from a serious hazard. Carvakas opposed the authority of Vedas and other religious texts but themselves transformed into an authoritative school which was based on the singularity of truth and rejected all other divergent ideas to be false (for ex- perception is the sole source of valid cognition). Thus, the advocacy of their own tenets transforms into a totalising imposition on the populace which is eventually rejected. The Bhakti movement arose as a response to the anomalies of the rigidity of the caste system, irrelevant rituals and religious practices, blind faiths and social dogmas and tended to present a liberal form of religion where devotees could identify themselves with simple religious practices. Although popular dissatisfaction against the existing social and religious evils was a major catalyst behind the spread of the Bhakti movement all over India for a long period of time, it did not discard belief and sadhana as two essential instruments for human liberation. Finally, it seems that Carvakas could not create a substantial culture around their philosophy which could sustain their ideas through practices, customs, art - architecture, literature and aesthetics. The failure of this aspect when the materialistic philosophy of Carvakas could not be institutionalised or materialized led to its gradual erosion from the minds of the masses.

References

1.     Bhattacharya, R. (2022). “Charvaka (Carvaka).”Handbook of Logical Thought in India.

2.     Chatterjee, S., & Datta, D. (1948). An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Third ed.). Calcutta University Press.

3.     Chattopadhyaya, D. (1959). Lokayata - A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism. People's Publishing House.https://archive.org/details/in.gov.ignca.5874/page/n5/mode/2up

4.     Garbe, R. (1897). The Philosophy of Ancient India. The Open Court Publishing Company.

5.     Gokhale, P. P. (1993, October). The Carvaka Theory of Pramanas: A Restatement. Philosophy East and West, 43, 675-682. https://archive.org/details/in.gov.ignca.5874/page/n5/mode/2up

6.     Heera, B. (2011). Uniqueness of Carvaka Philosophy in Traditional Indian Thought. Decent Books.

7.     Hiriyanna, M. (1993). Outlines of Indian Philosophy. Motilal Banarasidass Publishers.

8.     Pulingandla, R. (1975). Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy. Abingdon Press. https://archive.org/details/in.gov.ignca.5874/page/n5/mode/2up

9.     Radhakrishnan, S. (1927). Indian Philosophy (Second ed., Vol. 1). George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

10.  Sarva Darshan Samgraha (E.B. Cowell & A.E. Gough, Trans.). Trubner& Co. Ludgate. https://archive.org/details/in.gov.ignca.5874/page/n5/mode/2up

11.  Sharma, C. (1962). Indian Philosophy. Barnes & Noble, Inc. https://archive.org/details/in.gov.ignca.5874/page/n5/mode/2up

12.  Shastri, D. (1930). A Short History of Indian Materialism, Sensationalism and Hedonism (Second ed.). Bookland Private Limited.

13. Sinha, J. (1956). History of Indian Philosophy (Vol. One). Sinha Publishing House. https://archive.org/details/in.gov.ignca.5874/page/n5/mode/2up