Knowledge and Epistemology

Epistemology In Western Definitions

It is surprising that western philosophy, which prides itself on scientific innovation and technology, does not seem to have a proper theory of knowledge or epistemology. It has hardly spent time on developing the meaning of knowledge and methods to acquire it. The standard definition of knowledge in western philosophy is justified true belief (JTB). In 1963, American philosopher Edmund Gettier presented two famous counterexamples to the JTB account of knowledge. These two counterexamples came to be known as Gettier problems, along with a few more cases added by philosophers to the original two.

Gettier problems arise when there is a disconnect in the relationship between justification and truth.

A famous example for the reader is as follows:

Standing outside a field, X sees inside the field what exactly looks like a sheep. Let us call it A. X now has the belief that there are sheep in the field. He is right because behind the hill in the middle of the field there is a sheep, though he cannot see it. The justification of this belief is upon looking at A. But A is actually a dog disguised as a sheep. Hence, X has a well-justified true belief that there are sheep in the field. But is this belief, knowledge?

As per the standard definition, if a person holds a belief on justified grounds and that belief is true, then that person has knowledge. The counterexamples provided by Gettier show that the belief is true (a given), but the person’s reasons, though justified, cannot turn the belief into knowledge. It was plain luck that made the belief true. The counterexamples thus disprove the ‘justified true belief’ definition of knowledge. But there are problems in this account of both knowledge and the counterexamples that appear to undercut the definition of knowledge.

Śrī SN Balagangadhara Rao (Balu ji) in Cultures Differ Differently (Knowledge, Bullshit, and the Study of India) shows that the Gettier examples do not and possibly cannot challenge the definition of knowledge. Problems appear when we correctly interpret these examples. The role played by the indexical terms (meaning the reader, ‘you’ or we) in making the sentences true or false appears neglected in Gettier problems. Who proposes justifications for X’s beliefs? We do. It is we again who have justified true beliefs about X’s beliefs. Thus, we not only advance a claim about X’s epistemic state but construct examples in such a way that makes our claims true and justified.

However, X’s beliefs are examples of ignorance and not knowledge. Balu ji explains that “ignorance” is the negation of “knowledge.” With this move, X is in an epistemic state of ignorance, where the beliefs are wrong, and the justifications are false.

The Gettier problem arises because knowledge and ignorance are made to range over the same object in the same way at the same time and place for the same person. This move generates the ‘problem’.

In the Gettier examples, we have two different entities, ‘X’ and ‘us’, in opposing epistemic states (of ignorance and knowledge). X does not and cannot have knowledge because of ignorance (which is the negation of knowledge) and false beliefs (the negation of truth).

How could X then be said to have a ‘justified true belief’, which the definition demands? But we do have that knowledge both about the objects (the fake and real sheep) and about X’s belief. Thus, we have knowledge that X does not. Contrary to the examples, neither we nor X face Gettier’s problem. ‘Ignorance’ is when we have false beliefs and inadequate justifications.

Indic Theory of Knowledge: The Role Of Pramāṇas

Knowledge is the supreme ideal in Indian traditions. One of the attributes of Brahman, or the Self, which is the ground of the universe, is knowledge, and hence the pursuit of knowledge is the most divine pursuit in human endeavors. Indian texts developed an extensive theory of knowledge. Without such a theory, we could not have produced the enormous amounts of literature covering all aspects of life in the material (aparā) and spiritual realms (parā).

Any knowledge must have a certain means of acquiring it. Pramāṇa (proof or a valid ‘means of true knowledge’) plays an important role in Indian philosophical traditions. Ancient texts identify six pramāṇas whose variable acceptance and rejection form a basis for classifying thought systems. The first three are the main ones, and the other three are auxiliaries. These are:

Perception or direct sensory experience (pratyakṣa) Inference (anumāna) Testimony of reliable authorities (śabda) Comparison and analogy (upamāna) Postulation and derivation from circumstances (arthāpatti) Non-perceptive negative proof (anupalabdhi)

Materialism (Lokāyata or Cārvāka) holds only perception as a valid pramāṇa; Buddhism, perception and inference; and Jainism, perception, inference, and testimony. Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta hold all six as useful means of knowledge. The practical aspects of Yoga and meditation are acceptable routes in all systems (except Cārvāka) to access knowledge and finally reach the state of liberation.

In the West, scientific propositions have a criterion of physical verifiability; however, philosophy in the West has a different criterion. It is for this reason that philosophy earned a notoriously bad name in the early years of the twentieth century, when the entire field of metaphysics became ‘nonsense.’ The attack against philosophy came from the ‘Analytical Philosophers.’ Hence, in the absence of either _empirically verifiable propositions or derivations out of already defined terms, metaphysical statements became meaningless. _Since metaphysics, philosophy, ethics, religion, and aesthetics are all of this nature, the only task that remained for philosophy was that of clarification and analysis. They concluded that the propositions of philosophy are linguistic, not factual, and philosophy is a department of logic. Based on such assertions, Analytical Philosophy swept aside two millennia of lofty human thought into the dustbin of ‘emotive’ thinking.

However, Western philosophy had failed to provide a sound basis for epistemology (the theory of knowledge), and it became a complex maze of verbiage that ultimately led to the discrediting of everything metaphysical and of philosophy itself, says Śrī Chittaranjan Naik (apauruṣeyatva of the Vedas). The justified true belief definition of knowledge is the basis of its knowledge, and Gettier showed many problems with this notion by providing counterexamples. It is once again surprising to note that the West, which prides itself on so many scientific and technological developments, does not have a proper theory of knowledge. Its criteria for scientificity have also repeatedly undergone revisions.

In traditional Indian philosophy, assertions about the objects of the world are grounded either in perception or in inference. Hence, there is no scope for these assertions to stray into speculative thought. If they do stray, it is only due to the incorrect application of the pramāṇas. And when it comes to assertions about things that lie beyond the range of the senses, the assertions are grounded in scriptural sentences (śabda) and in inferences that depend entirely on these scriptural sentences. If they do stray here too, it is again due to an incorrect understanding of the scriptural sentences, or the inferences drawn from them.

Authored by Dr. Pingali Gopal. Published by Brhat.